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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDITH ELLEN DOGU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TURHAN S. DOGU,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17603

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by PlaintiffAppellant, Edith Ellen Dogu, against Defendant-Respondent,
Turhan S. Dogu.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable
Ronald 0. Hyde presiding sitting without a jury, granted a
Decree of Divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter referred
to as the "Wife", on the basis of "minimal grounds" as agreed
to between the parties (T. 88).

Defendant-Respondent, here-

inafter referred to as the "Husband", presented no grounds
for divorce, although representing that the case was "twosided" (T. 88).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Custody of the 17-year old daughter of the parties
was awarded to the Wife and the Husband was ordered to pay
$200 per month child support.

The Wife was awarded $1,500

per month alimony and upon Husband's retirement, said
alimony was to be automatically reduced to $750 per month.
The family home in Ogden was to be sold and the
net proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties
after the payment of the first mortgage and swimming pool debt.
Real property in Palm Coast, Florida was to be sold and the
proceeds divided equally between the parties.

Each party was

awarded one-half of any interest the parties might have in a
condominium in Turkey.
Wife was awarded savings certificates, bank accounts,
and corporate stock, with a total value of $23,450.

She was

also awarded a 1976 Chevrolet Monza.
Husband was awarded savings accounts of $2, 205, bank
accounts in his professional corporation of $26,308, a 1977
Cadillac, and his retirement benefits.
Husband was to pay the debts of the marriage and
each party was ordered to pay his own attorney's fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the
trial court's judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not fully
set forth the facts established at the trial, states incorrectly certain facts, and leaves out vital testimony
having a bearing upon the issues on appeal.
The parties were married to each other on August 10,
1957 in Indiana (T. 88).

The Husband was a medical doctor at

the time of this marriage.

Three children were born of the

marriage, two of whom are emancipated, and a 17-year old
daughter, Kismet, who resides with the Wife (T.89).

Kismet

is employed by her father, and she is paid $225 per month
for her work there (T. 130

& 136).

The 20-year old son of

the parties is studying to become a commercial pilot and the
Husband pays more than $500 per month for the son's.. education
and support which will continue for three and one-half years
(T. 136).

The Husband plans to support Kismet while she is

in college (T. 137).
Earlier in the marriage, the parties together
owned a home in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.

Contrary to the

Wife's Brief, this home was owned by both of the parties,
rather than just the Wife (T. 90).

In 1977, they sold this

home, together with a summer cottage in Pennsylvania, for
which they received in excess of $60,000, which they divided
equally between them (T. 90

& R.

27).

Each of the parties
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put $10,000 of this money into the acquisition of the family
home in Ogden and the Wife put $20, 000 into savings certificates
which she still owns (T. 92).

The substantial part of the

Husband's remaining $20,000 went to move the family from
Pennsylvania to Utah and for living expenses for the family
until he was able to establish his practice in Utah (T. 140),
In 1962, while living in Turkey, the parties purchased I
a condominium there at a cost of approximately $5, 000 American

I

money (T. 96 & 123).

I

The Wife testified that she has no idea

of the value of the condo but guesses that it might be worth
somewhere around $50,000 (T. 96).

The Husband testified that

the condo may be worth $200,500 Turkish lira to as high as
a million Turkish lira.

One dollar is worth about 70 Turkish

lira, so that his estimate would be between $2,864 and $14,285
American money (T. 1232.

He testified elsewhere that it may

have a value of around $30, 000 (T. 124).

Both of the parties

are now citizens of the United States (T. 91) and as such,
they cannot own real property in Turkey (T. 155).

The

condo was transferred to the Husband's sisters who have lived
in it for many years without any contributions to its upkeep
having been made by the parties (T. 124).

The Wife does not

desire to deprive the Husband's family of the use of the
condo (T. 96).
The assets of the parties at the time of the trial
consisted of the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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d

(a)

The family home in Ogden which was

appraised for $121,000 (R. 43) and has since
been sold for $122,000.

The court ordered

that the net proceeds be divided equally
between the parties (T. 164 & R. 79).

After

the payment of the debt against the home of
approximately $78,000 (T. 129), the parties
will each receive $22,000 from which they must
each pay one-half of the costs of sale.
(b)

A lot at Palm Coast, Florida which

cost $14,200 in 1964 and on which there is a
balance owing of $3,500, with the Husband
making payments of $175 per month (T. 138 & 139).
The court ordered that this property be sold and
the proceeds divided equally between the parties
(T. 164 & R. 79).
(c)

Bank accounts, savings certificates, and

E. F. Hutton stock in possession of Wife having a
total value of $23,450 (T. 93, T. 104, & R. 40).
These assets, together with the 1976 Monza, were
awarded to the Wife (T. 163 & R. 80).
(d)

Husband's accounts at McKay-Dee Hospital

Credit Union totaling $2,205 (T. 140).

These were

awarded to the Husband (T. 164 & R. 80).

-5-
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(e)

Bank accounts and savings certificates

owned by Husband's professional corporation totalino
0

$26,308 (T. 141).

There will be a substantial tax

liability against these accounts when withdrawn from
the professional corporation (T. 142).
awarded to the Husband (T. 164
(f)

These were

& R. 80).

The Husband has acquired certain retire-

ment benefits over the years.

These consist of a

TIAA and a CREF account created while the Husband was
a medical school professor in Pennsylvania.

There

is now approximately $27 ,000 in these two accounts
(T. 142) .

These accounts were contributed one-half

by the university and one-half by the Husband, and
he cannot withdraw the accounts until he turns 65
years of age (T. 142).

The Husband has a Keogh

retirement program through Prudential Life Insurance
Company of $10,075 which cannot be withdrawn until
retirement (T. 143).
There is also a pension and profit sharing
trust set up through the Husband's professional
corporation in which there is a total of $49,655
deposited in certificate and savings accounts.
This cannot be withdrawn until retirement (T. 143) ·
The Husband did not set up the pension and profit
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sharing trust until three years ago and because of
his advanced age, he made sizable contributions
to the trust during those years (T. 144).

The

Husband was awarded his retirement benefits (T. 163

R. 80).
The Statement of Facts in the Wife's Brief overstates the Husband's savings and retirement benefits by a
substantial amount (See page 4 of Wife's Brief).

Her

statement that there was $45,000 in timeway certificates and
that another $25,000 was added to that account is incorrect.
There were initially two $10,000 savings certificates to which
another $25,000 was added, making a total of $45,000 (T. 119).
By the time of the trial, that was increased to a total of
$49,655, which is the total amount in the pension and profit
sharing trust (T. 143).

The Wife's statement that there is

$10,000 in a Keogh account and $10,075 in a Prudential
Insurance Company annuity is incorrect.

These are one and

the same investment (T. 143).
The Husband's taxable income in 1977 was $36,973
and in 1978 it was $60,854 (T. 147).

At the present time,

he is employed by his professional corporation and draws a
salary of $4,200 per month and, in addition, takes bonuses
as needed and available (T. 127

& 128).

In 1979, he withdrew

from the corporation as salary and bonus a total of $108,675
(T. 148} but in order to do so, he drew $9,700 more than
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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&

the corporation had available and the professional corporation
therefore, suffered a loss of $9,700 (T. 151).

In 1979, the

parties paid $35,897 of federal income tax and $4,448 of
state income tax, using income averaging (T. 149).

Because of

the change in deductions and income averaging, the Husband's
taxes will be substantially higher in the future (T. 150).
The Husband was a 56-year old anesthesiologist at
the time of the trial (T. 90).

In 1978, he suffered a stroke

known as a transient isometric attack and was also hospitalized
for double vision (T. 151).
The Husband is working between 60 to 110 hours per
week (T. 152) and with his health condition, he cannot
continue that pace (T. 153).

It is anticipated that another

anesthesiologist will be hired which will further cut back
the Husband's working hours (T. 152).
The Wife intends to work (T. 90) and is attending
business college (T. 102), and expects to be employed in
about a year from the trial date of August 27, 1980 (T. 103) ·

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIVISION OF ASSETS BY THE COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND
DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT

-8-
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In the case of Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431
P.2d 802 (1967) this court stated:
"In reviewing the trial court's order in
divorce proceedings there are certain well
established principles to be borne in mind.
The
findings and order are endowed with a presumption
of validity, and the burden is upon the appellant
to show they are in error. Even though our constitutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIII,
states that in equity cases this court may review
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the
advantaged position of the trial judge. Accordingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court
believed the evidence which supports the findings.
We review the whole evidence in the light most
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them
merely because this court might have viewed the
matter differently, but only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings."
The Wife has not borne the burden of overcoming
the presumption of validity of the court's finding and order.
The court divided the equities in all of the real property
equally between the parties.

The Wife does not appear to

object to each of the parties receiving one-half of the proceeds
of the Ogden home and a like division of the Florida property,
but she complains of the court's order regarding the condominium in Turkey.

The court, however, wisely recognized that

the Turkey condo is somewhat of an unknown quantity.

The

parties paid a total of $5,000 to acquire it but neither of
them own it at the present time because of prohibitions against
non-Turkish citizens owning real estate there.

-9-

It's present
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value is speculative, with the Husband testifying that it's
value in American money may be as low as $2, 864 and as high
as $30,000, and the Wife making a wild guess that it may be
worth as much as $50, 000.

The court correctly ordered that

if either party was able to exercise ownership over the
Turkey condo, then each party was to be awarded a one-half
interest therein (R. 79).

This is consistent with the Wife's

request set out in her Exhibit 1 (R. 40) that the Turkey cone
be sold and the proceeds divided equally.

If, and when, the

parties can exercise ownership control over the condo, that i
very thing will be done.

There was no evidence presented in

the trial that this property is in any way an asset of the
parties at the present time.
The remaining assets, exclusive of the Husband's
retirement benefits, consisted primarily of bank accounts,
savings certificates, and stock.
accounts totaling $23, 600.

The Wife was awarded such

The Husband received credit union

accounts in his own name of $2, 205 and accounts and certifier
in his professional corporation totaling $26, 308.

When such

funds are withdrawn from the corporation, they will be subje;:
to substantial income taxes which will reduce them to the
point that the savings of the Wife and those of the Husband
will be substantially comparable.
Each of the parties was awarded an automobile, his
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Cadillac having somewhat more value than her Chevrolet, but
this having been off set by her having received the substantial
part of the household furniture and furnishings.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION
IN AWARDING THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO HUSBAND
AND REQUIRING HIM TO PAY ALIMONY AFTER HIS RETIREMENT
The court correctly considered the ages, health
conditions, earning capacities, and child support needs of the
parties, and awarded the Wife $18,000 per year alimony and
$2,400 per year child support.

In addition, the Husband pays

over $6,000 per year for the support and education of his
aviation-student son.

This amounts to over $26,000 per year

in support responsibilities.

In addition, the Husband was

ordered to pay the mortgage payment on the house of $469 per
month and payment of $175 per month on the Florida lot, until
those properties are sold (R. 801.
This court, in the case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d
79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956} stated that:
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of
their economic resources so that the parties
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis."
The Wife in this case is beginning anew with $23,600
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of savings and stock, well over $20,000 from the proceeds of
the Ogden home and the Florida property, household furnitun
and furnishings,

$18, 000 per year alimony, and any income she

might earn upon completion of her business school training.
This should be more than sufficient to enable her to reconstruct her life "on a happy and useful basis".
The Wife's implication that the $25, 000 of account:
receivable from the Husband's medical practice is a
marital asset is not valid.

This is part of the Husband's

future income, on which he must pay income taxes and from
which he must pay the Wife's alimony.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Husband
should be awarded his retirement benefits, consisting of
$27,061 in TIAA and CREF, $10,075 in his Keogh plan with
Prudential Life Insurance, and $49,665 in his pension and
profit sharing trust.

The evidence was that none of these

funds can be withdrawn until the Husband retires, and
pursuant to this court's decision in the case of Bennettv.
Bennett, Utah, 607 P. 2d 839 (1980), the husband's retirement
benefits should not be considered as one of the assets of~
parties.

This court suggested in the Bennett case that wheri

the husband could withdraw the amount of contributions he ha:
made to his retirement fund at any time prior to 31 days bef:
he was eligible to retire, that fund might appropriately be
considered a marital asset.

The court specifically ruled,
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however, that where the fund cannot be withdrawn until
retirement, no present value can be assigned thereto, and it
should not be considered one of the assets of the parties.
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent
case of McCarty v. McCarty, 69 L.Ed.2d 589, decided June 26,
1981, held that military retirement benefits which accrued
during the parties' marriage and which could not be withdrawn
until the husband's retirement, were not subject to division
between the parties and should be awarded solely to the
husband.
If this court should hold, notwithstanding the previously cited cases, that the Husband's retirement benefits are
assets having a present value, the trial court still made a
fair and equitable decision in awarding those benefits to the
Husband.

This court, in the case of Englert v. Englert, Utah,

576 P.2d 1274, in.referring to a husband's pension fund or
insurance, stated:
"These should be given due consideration
along with all other assets, income and the
earnings and the potential earning capacity
of the parties, in determining what is the
most practical, just and equitable way to
serve the best interests and welfare of the
parties and their children."
In the present case, the court took the retirement
benefits into consideration and wisely ruled that rather than

-13-
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physically divide those benefits between the parties, he
would require the Husband, after his retirement, to continue
to pay the Wife alimony of $7 50 per month, or $9, 000 per yea:
The source from which the alimony will have to be paid at
that time will be the Husband's retirement benefits.

The

trial judge in stating, "I think the idea that removing thosi
[retirement benefits] from assets and continuing alimony rnak 1
good sense" (R. 163), did not abuse his discretion, but rath1
made sound provision for the maintenance of the Wife after
the Husband's retirement.

CONCLUSION
The trial court made a fair and equitable award of
the property of the parties by ordering that the real estate'
be sold and the net proceeds be divided equally between the
parties.

The remaining assets, consisting of bank accounts,

stock, automobiles, and household furniture, including thebs
accounts in the Husband's professional corporation, were al::
divided fairly and equitably between the parties on a substantially 50-50 basis.
The court made the only feasible order possible
regarding the condominium in Turkey by granting a one-half
interest to each of the parties in whatever ownership rights
the parties have in that property.

-14-
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It was not an abuse of discretion by the trial
court to award the Husband his retirement benefits and require
that he use them as a source of paying the Wife substantial
alimony after his retirement.
The judgment and decree of the trial court should
therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

7s/ C. Gerald Parker
C. Gerald Parker
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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